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Abstract
Reversals of policy recommendations occur in risk management when the social deci-
sion maker aggregates individuals’ subjective utilities for the outcomes of a risky policy
measure. The level of detail with which these outcomes are described can significantly
affect the resulting policy recommendation. The choice of the level of detail on which
we conduct an analysis therefore amounts to an implicit value judgement. Moreover, the
power to fix the level of the analysis implies partial control over policy recommendations.
We propose an alternative approach to decision–theoretically sound risk management.
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1 Introduction
The decision–theoretic approach to risk management structures the process of social
decision making into two carefully separated parts and then uses concepts from decision
analysis to arrive at a policy recommendation (Raiffa, 1968). In the first part, the
highly professionalized discipline of probabilistic risk assessment procures probabilities
for social decision making (Henley/Kumamoto, 1992). In the second part, a social utility
function is constructed. We focus on applications, such as health care economics or
environmental cost–benefit analysis, where a social utility is obtained on the basis of
individuals’ subjective utilities for the outcomes of a risky policy measure. In these
applications, social utility is typically defined as the average of the individuals’ utilities
(Haddix et al., 1996). Decision–theoretic risk management then proceeds by maximizing
the expected social utility relative to the estimated probabilities.
We show that this structure renders risk management decisions sensitive to a factor
that has not been explicitly acknowledged in the literature. This factor is the degree of
detail with which we describe the outcomes of a policy measure. Consider the decision
problem of a group of directors who consider building a production plant in Europe.
Suppose some member of the panel assigns a positive value to owning a plant in Europe.
We can then make the individual’s reasons for this evaluation more transparent by giving
a finer description of this outcome. Consider only the two possibilities of, firstly, owning
a production plant in Europe in a climate of an increasing Euro/USD exchange rate and,
secondly, owning a production plant in Europe in a climate of a non–increasing exchange
rate. The main phenomenon that drives our argument can now be stated easily: Different
individuals may agree in their evaluation of a coarsely described outcome and yet disagree
in their reasons for this evaluation. One individual may regard a rise in the exchange
rate likely but only slightly beneficial, while another individual may regard a rise in the
exchange rate unlikely but highly beneficial. The individuals’ opposing reasons may thus
lead to the same overall evaluation of the situation. Note that we have not made any
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new information available to the individuals but have only refined our description of the
individuals’ evaluations.
We shall study the effect that refinements of an analysis have on risk management
decisions. Due to the structure of the decision–theoretic risk management process, this
effect can in theory be dramatic and is in practice non–negligible. It can lead to an insta-
bility and a reversal of the policy recommendations. On a first level of description, policy
a may be strictly preferred to policy b while on a second, more detailed, level of descrip-
tion b is strictly preferred to b. There is nothing in principle to stop this phenomenon to
occur repeatedly. On a third, yet more detailed, level of description, policy a may again
be strictly preferred to policy b and so forth. Throughout, the inclusion of additional
parameters leaves the individuals’ expected utilities unchanged. In other words, the re-
finement is irrelevant from the viewpoint of the individuals’ decision making. We would
have wished that such a refinement should also be irrelevant from the viewpoint of social
decision making but, unfortunately, it is not. In statistics, similar phenomena are more
familiar. Their theoretical possibility was first discussed by Simpson (1951) (hence the
name ‘Simpson’s paradox’) who pointed out that the level of the analysis can influence
the conclusions about statistical correlations in the data. In a famous study on gender
bias in the admissions process of Berkeley University, Bickel/Hammel/O’Connell (1977)
found that an analysis of the overall admissions figures suggested a gender bias against
women, while a more fine–grained analysis on a departmental basis found either no such
trend or, in some departments, even a reverse trend. (For a more recent example from
epidemiology, cf. Reintjes et al., 2000).
We give several illustrations of such phenomena in risk management. We then ar-
gue that there are no objective criteria for determining on which level a risk analysis
should be conducted. This simple observation has two important implications. On the
one hand, we can draw a methodological lesson for risk management: The choice of a
relevant level of detail reflects a value judgement that ought to be make explicit in the
analysis. On the other hand, we can draw a political lesson: The power to select a level
of detail implies influence and partial control over the resulting policy recommendation.
In all illustrations, we assume for simplicity that individuals and society maximize ex-
pected utility. A general statement of our result shows that these phenomena are not
the artifact of a particular decision theory but a consequence of the very structure of the
risk management process. After we expose the philosophical assumptions underlying the
current practice of risk management, we suggest a concrete and practical approach to
decision–theoretically sound risk management.
2 The Phenomenon
The structure of the risk management process
We focus on applications in which the construction of a social utility depends directly
on individuals’ subjective utilities for the possible outcomes of a policy measure. In such
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applications, social utility is typically obtained by averaging the individuals’ subjective
utilities, although the aggregation method may take a more complicated form. Given
some method of aggregating individual utilities into a social utility, the structure of the
risk management process can be studied abstractly. The theoretical literature on social
choice refers to processes of this general type as ‘ex post social choice rules’ (Hammond,
1981). Rules of this type factor individuals’ subjective evaluations of risky alternatives,
i.e., individuals’ expected utilities, into two separate components. These components
are, on the one hand, the individuals’ subjective probabilities and, on the other hand,
their subjective utilities. These utilities for the outcomes of a risky policy measure are
referred to as ‘ex post’ utilities. Processes of this class can be contrasted with ‘ex ante
social choice rules’ that start from a different basis for social policy recommendations.
The starting point of ex ante rules are not factorized probabilities and utilities but the
compound evaluation that integrates these factors into the expected utility of a risky
alternative. These expected utilities are also called ‘ex ante’ utilities. Examples of ex
ante social choice rules are ubiquitous. Majority voting in a referendum or a committee
is one example where individuals express ex ante evaluations of risky alternatives by
casting their votes. Auctions for telecommunication bandwidths are another example
where individuals express their ex ante evaluations by bidding with money. We emphasize
that our phenomenon does not occur within processes of the ex ante type. Hence, the
phenomenon is clearly a result of the factorization of ex ante evaluations into probabilities
and ex post utilities.
The motivation for a factorization of ex ante evaluations into probabilities and (ex
post) utilities is fundamentally a philosophical one. According to a common normative
argument, risk managers ought to separate questions of fact (probabilities) and questions
of value (utilities). The distinction between facts and values was most famously drawn
by Hume (1739–40) and has been a central concept of ethics ever since (Hare, 1981).
Hume’s maxim: Factorize beliefs and values!
Implicit is the view that beliefs enjoy a special status vis-a-vis values that allows us
to apply the norms of rational discourse and of scientific method to disagreeing beliefs.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1975) was the first to put this conviction into
practice, thereby creating the discipline of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).
PRA’s maxim: Be rational about probabilities!
Disagreements about values, on the other hand, pose a more difficult problem. It is
commonly agreed that values can be the object of a rational analysis only in as far as
they draw on factual assumptions. To use an example from environmental cost–benefit
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analysis, consider the decision to build a hydroelectric power station that runs the risk
of cutting off the water supply of an extensive wooded area downstream. Environmental
cost–benefit analysis routinely elicits the public’s value for keeping some woodland intact.
Members of the public can assign different values to the preservation of the forrest, for
instance, because they hold different beliefs about the effects of acid rain. The factoriza-
tion of the disagreement into a factual and an evaluative part is then intended to help
arbitrate disagreements in a rational manner. PRA analyses the possible effects of acid
rain, while any remaining disagreements about the utility of environmental preservation
are settled by averaging individuals’ subjective values (at least in the applications that we
will consider). PRA’s maxim is often overlaid by a somewhat paternalistic categorization
of those topics of which the lay public is deemed a competent judge. Matters of risk and
uncertainty are typically the reserve of expert professionals, while the evaluation of the
ex post outcomes of a risky policy is often the privilege of the lay public.
Our punch line will be that the factorization of beliefs and values is an iterative,
fractal–like process. What is a value on one level of analysis is a compound of be-
liefs and values on another level of analysis. Moreover, the recommendations obtained
from decision–theoretic risk management are sensitive to how exactly compounded eval-
uations are factorized into beliefs and values. We must acknowledge that, within the
current structure of the decision–theoretic risk management process, a value judgement
is required to determine what counts as a relevant level of analysis or, equivalently, what
counts as a relevant factorization of expected utilities into probabilities and utilities. As
a solution to this problem, we will propose a concrete and practical process that is true
to PRA’s maxim but abandons Hume’s maxim.
Example: Quality of Life
Quality Adjusted Live Years (QUALYs) are regularly estimated by presenting individuals
with choices among lotteries over outcomes affecting the individuals’ quality of life. In
health care, for example, one wishes to estimate an individual’s utility for an outcome
C described in medical terms. The standard approach chooses the hypothetical medical
states of perfect Health and certain Death as reference points in the estimation process.1
The individual is then offered a hypothetical choice between the following options:
Option 1: Health with probability p and Death with probability 1− p.
Option 2: Outcome C with certainty.
For the sake of the argument, we accept the decision–theoretic assumptions embodied
in this methodology (von Neumann/Morgenstern, 1947). We shall also not touch on the
problem of hypothetical choices. If we then normalize the utility of Health to be 100 and
1The choice of Health and Death as reference points leads to an implicit normalization and interper-
sonal comparison of individual utilities.
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the utility of Death to be 0, we obtain ui(C) = 100 · p whenever individual i becomes
indifferent between Option 2 and Option 1.
Quality of life measures can be applied to the problem of allocating donor kidneys
to patients with kidney failure. The problem of kidney allocation is an example of
risk management because the process of allocation involves several sources of uncer-
tainty. For instance, kidney failures and therefore the arrival of patients on the wait-
ing list form a stochastic process, just like the availability of donor organs and the
success of transplantations (Hild, 2001e). Alternative allocation mechanisms therefore
correspond to risky policy measures. In evaluating alternative allocation mechanisms,
Zenios/Wein/Chertow (1999), for instance, use a quality of life measure (which in their
case seems to be chosen purely ad hoc). We will argue that the use of such measures
harbours an important problem that needs to be addressed by an explicit choice of a
relevant level for describing the outcomes of the policy. Let C be the outcome that the
patient receives a donor kidney for transplantation. Our inquiry starts from the trivial
observation that the description of the outcome C allows several refinements and several
interpretations because several additional attributes are left implicit in the outcome C.
For instance, both donor organs and patients come in different medical types that vary
in their compatibility. Currently, compatibility is measured in terms of HLA antigen
matches (EBPG, 2000). This measure offers a good (although not optimal) proxy for the
expected survival time of the kidney in the recipient’s organism (Wujciak/Opelz, 1993).
Moreover, donor organs are received only after a waiting period of variable length due
to short supply. In the coarse–grained description C these attributes are not mentioned.
Consider the following refined descriptions:
C1: receiving a transplant with a good fit after a short waiting time.
C2: receiving a transplant with a good fit after a long waiting time.
C3: receiving a transplant with a poor fit after a short waiting time.
C4: receiving a transplant with a poor fit after a long waiting time.
Individuals may now differ both in their probabilities and utilities for these additional
attributes. We fix our time horizon at 1 year. For simplicity, we consider only two types
of individuals that occur in equal proportions within the population. These types differ
in their preferences for a good fit and a short waiting time. Individuals of type 1 put
more emphasis on a good fit, whereas individuals of type 2 put more emphasis on a short
waiting time. Type 1 refuses to accept an organ with a poor fit and, hence, assigns zero
probability to outcomes C3 and C4. There is a 50–50 chance that an individual of type
1 will have to wait only for a short period of time. Type 2 has a strong preference for
a short waiting time and therefore accepts any organ offered. For simplicity, we assume
that type 2 has a zero probability for a long waiting time (outcomes C1 and C3). There
is a 50–50 chance that an individual of type 2 will receive an organ with a good fit.
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transplant Expected utility
p1: 1
u1: 70 70
p2: 1
u2: 70 70
p0: 1
u0: 70 70
good fit, good fit, poor fit, poor fit,
short wait long wait short wait long wait Expected utility
p′1: .5 .5 0 0
u′1: 60 80 5 20 70
p′2: 0 .5 0 .5
u′2: 20 80 5 60 70
p′0: .25 .5 0 .25
u′0: 40 80 5 40 60
Table 1: Kidney allocation on two levels of analysis.
The upper part of Table 1 shows the individuals’ utilities ui for receiving outcome C
with certainty. Stacking the cards against our phenomenon, we assume that the individ-
uals agree on these utilities and thus arrive at an identical social utility u0 for receiving
outcome C with certainty. On this level, individual and social probabilities p1, p2, p0 are
degenerate. The lower part of the same table shows the subjective probabilities p′i and
utilities u′i of individuals in these types. The table also shows the social probabilities p
′
0
and the social utilities u′0.
The individuals’ probabilities and utilities are chosen such that the refined description
of the outcomes is fully compatible with the coarser description C. In other words, the
refinement is irrelevant from the viewpoint of the individuals’ decision making. Their
preferences have not changed as a result of the refinement since their utility for the
coarsely describe outcome C already incorporates their more fine–grained beliefs and
utilities. In particular, the individuals have not received any new information. Formally,
we have ui(C) = p
′
i(C1) ·u′i(C1)+ . . .+p′i(C4) ·u′i(C4) for each type i. Hence, in the above
lottery, either type of individual would become indifferent between Option 1 and Option
2 at a p–value of 70% on either level of analysis.
We assume that the individuals’ subjective probabilities are indeed the correct objec-
tive probabilities. Our argument does not hinge upon an assumption that the individuals
are misinformed. We arrive at a social utility by averaging the individuals’ subjective
utilities. Our phenomenon occurs when we now calculate the social utility for the out-
come C on different levels of description. On the first level, we obtain a social utility of
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u0(C) = 70. On the second level, we obtain a social utility of u
′
0(C) = 60 (although the
individuals’ expected utilities remain unchanged). It is time to emphasize that the risk
management techniques under consideration are of a quantitative nature and, moreover,
highly sensitive to differences in quantitative assumptions. Hence, a difference of about
14% in the social utility can quickly lead to different qualitative recommendations. If we
were interested in dramatization, we could easily conjure up numbers that lead to more
extreme discrepancies (Hild, 2001a).
We may pursue the process of refinement yet further and include additional personal
factors specific to each individual. An individual’s evaluations of ‘long’ waiting times
may again be compounded from beliefs and values. The individuals may, for instance,
have probabilities for the event that their family becomes dependent on their physical
support (e.g., if a child or a partner falls ill). A patient’s priority for a short waiting
time might then be explained by her high probability of her husband suffering a stroke.
Depending on their circumstances, different patients may also have different utilities for
being able to help needy family members (e.g., if the patient is a single mother of a small
child or a grandmother in a family of 10). With this refined analysis, we again open
up the possibility of changing social choices. On each level of refinement, we have to
decide whether the new factorization of beliefs and values is relevant for the social choice
problem. The inclusion of personal factors such as the family’s special needs may or may
not be judged relevant.
Our observation is not that the social decision maker needs to decide which parameters
of a choice problem are relevant from a social perspective. Rather, the social decision
maker needs to decide what is the appropriate form of factorizing individuals’ beliefs and
values. If QUALY measurements depend on how finely we describe the medical conditions
of interest, an obvious idea suggests itself: Perhaps we should use finest description
possible. We will discuss such suggestions in the next section. For now, we note that the
level of analysis does, indeed, need fixing, by one method or another.
The Worldbank devised a measure of Disability Adjusted Life Years based on the
evaluation of medical conditions by a panel of medical experts (cf. Worldbank, 1993
and Murray/Lopez/Jamison, 1994). This construction of a social utility fixes the level
of description for the different medical conditions once and for all and thus avoids our
problem. Unfortunately, the Worldbank developed this analysis for estimating the global
distribution of diseases. For our problem of kidney allocation, this approach is of no
help because events like the allocation of a kidney for transplantation are beyond the
resolution of the Worldbank’s analysis.
Example: Technological risk
We consider the same phenomenon in the perhaps more familiar context of technological
risk management. We consider a study of solar energy as an alternative to nuclear energy.
We have two alternatives:
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C: use of nuclear energy in status quo.
D: develop solar energy.
In order to estimate the social utility of C, we might consider the individuals’ will-
ingness to pay for retaining the status quo. In other words, since it is very costly at
the present time to replace nuclear energy by solar energy, we wish to estimate up to
what cost individuals would be prepared to go along with a change in energy policy.
Techniques based on willingness to pay are widely used in environmental cost–benefit
analysis. Again, we take no issue with the problems inherent in this methodology since
our purpose is to illustrate an unrelated point. We consider refined descriptions of out-
come C. An obvious detail to include is the risk of a nuclear accident on the scale, say,
of the Chernobyl accident and within the time horizon, say, 50 years.
C1: status quo without serious accident.
C2: status quo with some serious accident.
We again turn our attention to two types of individuals that occur with equal pro-
portions within the populations. Let us assume that both types assign the same value to
outcome C, namely ui(C) = 10. Hence, social utility also equals 10 (i.e., u0(C) = 10).
These values are shown in the upper part of Table 2. (On the coarse–grained level, all
probabilities are, again, degenerate.) Differences emerge only on the more fine–grained
level. Individual of type 1 believe that nuclear accidents are unlikely but disastrous in
their consequences. Individual of type 2 believe that nuclear accidents are more likely
but localized and moderate in their consequences. Type 1 represents the ‘old school’ of
nuclear risk management. The ‘new school’ of type 2 believes in non–linear model and a
low response of cancer rates in adults to temporary radiation leakage (e.g., Jaworowski,
1999, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1996). In our example, both schools
of thought arrive at the very same expected utilities of 10 for the benefits of nuclear
energy in the status quo (shown in the lower part of Table 2). Moreover, individuals
have complete agreement about the utility of the status quo without an accident (i.e.,
u′1(C2) = u
′
2(C2) = 20).
It is, of course, not surprising that expected social utility may differ from the indi-
viduals’ expected utilities. What is surprising is that we again observe a change in social
utility across these two levels of analysis. Note that we have again assumed that the
correct social probability is the average of individual probabilities. This is not a neces-
sary assumption and our general result allows social probabilities provided by experts
to disagree strongly with the average layman’s probability. This possibility only exac-
erbates our problem. By assuming that social probability is the average of individual
probabilities, we have constrained our example in favour of a stable social choice because
we have precluded the introduction of new information through the experts’ analysis.
Nonetheless, we were not able to guarantee stability. This shows that the effect is not
due to an increase in information about matters of fact but only due to the way in which
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nuclear energy Expected utility
p1: 1
u1: 10 10
p2: 1
u2: 10 10
p0: 1
u0: 10 10
accident no accident Expected utility
p′1: .1 .9
u′1: −80 20 10
p′2: .2 .8
u′2: −30 20 10
p′0: .15 .85
u′0: −55 20 8.75
Table 2: Nuclear energy on two levels of analysis.
we factorize individuals’ evaluations. Our general result will show that instabilities are
completely independent of the manner in which social probabilities are constructed.2
A general result
On theoretical grounds, instability phenomena are an inherent feature of the way in
which the decision–theoretic risk management process is structured. To arrive at general
theorem, we need very few assumptions about the model that captures the individuals’
decision making.3 We make no assumptions whatsoever about the manner in which social
probabilities are constructed. We thus allow the individuals’ probabilities to be replaced
by some experts’ risk assessment for the purpose of social decision making. We shall
assume that a social utility is constructed by averaging individuals’ utilities. We make
2Again, we could consider a second refinement that analyzes whether the low–response hypothesis is
true or false. This description would include details about the groups of individuals, such as children
and adults, that are most affected by a nuclear accident. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(1996) notes that children suffer proportionately more than adults. Even individuals who agree on their
probability for the low–response hypothesis could therefore still disagree in their utility for equal and
unequal distribution of negative effects among children and adults.
3Individual decision making may be modelled by any of the following theories: expected utility
theory, expected utility theory with threshold, expected utility theory with non–additive probabilities
(Choquet–expected utility theory), rank dependent utility theory, prospect theory, weighted utility the-
ory, Machina’s theory, regret theory or any ordinal decision theory based on ‘precautionary principles’
like leximin.
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this unnecessarily strong assumption only to simplify the presentation. For technical
details, we refer the reader to Hild (2001a).
Theorem 2.1 If a social utility is constructed by averaging individuals’ utilities, then
there is an infinite sequence of increasingly refined descriptions of the outcomes of a
risky policy such that the risk management process leads to contradictory policy recom-
mendations ad infinitum although the individuals’ beliefs and utilities are fully compatible
across all levels of description.
The proof of this theorem turns on the simple observation that individuals who have
identical preferences for ‘different reasons’. More precisely, the identity of two individuals’
expected utilities does not imply the identity of either their probabilities or their utilities.
One individual might judge a certain consequence of an act unlikely but highly desirable,
another might judge the consequence more likely but less desirable, and yet both may
agree on their overall evaluation of the act.
3 Evaluation
Minimal recommendations
We have found that policy choices may depend on the level on which a risk management
study is conducted and on the manner in which individuals’ evaluations are factorized
into beliefs and values. If we must use the current structure of the decision–theoretic risk
management process, then we should at least keep the following minimal recommenda-
tions in mind.
• Make the choice of the level of analysis explicit in study.
• Consider and discuss alternative choices.
Incidentally, since the current practice of risk management does not vary the level
of analysis within a study, we cannot offer any concrete data that display our effect of
policy reversals. The data that would allow us to locate such effects have simply not
been collected.
We return to the idea to choose as finely–grained an analysis as possible:
• Let choice be guided by feasibility considerations, such as the degree of detail for
which can we provide data.
There are several difficulties with this idea. Firstly, there is, of course, no reason
to believe that an ultimate, maximally fine–grained, description of reality exists. More
importantly, there is a second, epistemic, problem. Even if a level of analysis existed
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beyond which no instabilities of social choice occurred, we could never know whether
our analysis has reached such a critical level. Yet, there might be a practical end to the
refinability of our analysis. Beyond a certain level of detail, we may simply run out of
statistical data for a probabilistic risk assessment. This is perhaps a stop–gap solution
to our problem, but it is not fully satisfactory. Since the choice of a level of analysis
can significantly influence the recommendation of a policy, there is room for political
manipulation through a clever choice of a favourable level of detail. This problem is
mitigated only by the difficulty to foresee what level of detail will yield which social
choice. Nonetheless, we should take note of this political context.
• Contain the power to choose the level of analysis.
• Let choice be made by a disinterested party.
A decision–theoretically sound alternative
The current practice of decision–theoretic risk management factorizes social decision
making into the two separate parts of probabilistic risk assessment and the construction
of a social utility. This very structure leads to potential instabilities in policy recom-
mendations. Alternative social choice rules such as majority voting in committees or
the auctioning of telecommunications bandwidths do not have such defects. In this type
of process, no instabilities occur (Hild, 2001a). We now propose an approach to risk
management that retains the virtues of the decision–theoretic approach and is, at the
same time, not culpable of its vices. The current decision–theoretic risk management
process has two main attractions. Firstly, it professes to be decision–theoretically sound
and, secondly, it embodies PRA’s maxim to be rational about probabilities. We share
the appreciation of these two properties. We object, however, to the implicit acceptance
of Hume’s maxim to factorize individuals’ ex ante evaluations into beliefs and utilities.
This assumption is an unnecessary addition to the first two properties.
This philosophical change of heart implies clear changes for the practice of risk man-
agement. We uphold PRA in order to let scientific method and rational discourse bear
on social choice. But, instead of adopting the experts’ risk assessment as a social proba-
bility, we communicate the results of PRA to the individuals concerned. Individuals are
then given the opportunity to update their beliefs with this new information and thus
to arrive at a better informed appreciation of the risk involved. This use of PRA puts
a great responsibility on the communication of risks. Fortunately, the actual practice
of risk communication and experimental studies in psychology are providing us with a
growing understanding of how best to communicate risk. Assuming that probabilistic
information is communicated in a psychologically tractable format, social choice then
proceeds in an ex ante fashion along the familiar lines of majority votes, auctions etc.
The important contribution of PRA is to base risk management choices on the ex ante
evaluations of better informed individuals. To coin a term, we call this feedback process
interactive risk management. We summarize the steps of this process:
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Step 1: Probabilistic risk assessment.
Step 2: Communicate PRA to individuals concerned.
Step 3: Individuals update their beliefs.
Step 4: Social choice by individuals’ ex ante evaluations.
We note with satisfaction that interactive risk management also avoids the many
empirical problems with the elicitation of individual utilities. Ex post aggregation is
intrinsically bound to the use of detailed quantitative information about the individuals’
ex post utilities. In the previous section, we have accepted without questions that such
information can be reliably obtained. In fact, this is an extremely problematic (that
is to say, false) assumption. Many empirical studies of individuals’ decision making
show that they systematically deviate from the theoretical assumptions that underly any
methodology for measuring their ex post utilities.
Interactive aggregation is most attractive for small expert–like groups of individuals.
Consider the situation of a board of directors of a company that has to decide on a cor-
porate strategy. Studies are conducted trying to gain insights into the probable effects
of a strategy. The results of these PRA studies are communicated to the members of the
board. Remaining uncertainties and disagreeing values are discussed by the board and,
finally, a group choice is reached by voting or informal mitigation processes. This process
can be applied directly to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s objective of selecting a landing
site for a future Mars mission (cf. http://www.jpl.nasa.gov). Different scientific interests
typically favour the selection of different landing sites. An additional factor in the man-
agement’s choice of a landing site is the probable success of the mission. With missions
to Mars, the current landing technology is a source of considerable uncertainty that lead
to a loss of the space probe, especially in rugged terrain. The challenge is to optimize
the expected value of the mission. Some of the suggested solutions to this problem follow
the ex post mould of decision–theoretic risk management and are therefore sensitive to
the level of detail on which the analysis is conducted (Miles, 2001). Interactive ex ante
aggregation takes the following approach to the problem: A PRA study of the landing
phase is conducted and its results are then communicated to the different science teams.
After the teams have updated their beliefs with this information, a managerial decision
is made on the basis of the scientists’ updated ex ante evaluations of the alternative
landing sites. This decision can be achieved through informal means, through votes or
the design of an auction (Ledyard/Porter/Wessen, 2000). Our current research adapts
existing work on auction theory to the specific context of risk management.
Another place where this approach is put into practice is our own proposal to solve
the kidney allocation problem that was presented in the previous section (Hild, 2001e).
In this proposal, the ex ante evaluation of the uncertainties arising from the allocation
process is the privilege of the patient. We communicate to the patient in a psychologically
manageable format all available information about the expected survival times of organs
depending on the donor’s and the patient’s medical types. We also offer active decision
12
support and make tools for decision analysis available to the patient. We then choose an
ex ante allocation mechanism that avoids any form of dependence on the description of
medical outcomes. These concrete and practical implications show that it can at times
be well worth questioning one’s philosophical assumptions.
Acknowledgements: I wish to thank Ralph Miles for his help.
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